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United Nations Security Council Resolution
242 |
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Interpreting its Meaning and Relevance for
the State of Israel |
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction
3
2. Israels
Borders under International Law
...5
3. The
United Nations
..13
4. The Six
Day War
..
16
5. Legal
Warfare
..22
6. Interpretation
of Resolution 242
.28
7. Aftermath
of Resolution 242
...44
8. Conclusion
52
9. Bibliography
59
Introduction
Despite the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict has been ongoing
since 1948, if not from the early 1920s, many continue to see the aftermath of
the 1967 Six Day War as the main source of the major issues which still prevent
peace from being achieved in the Middle East.
Issues such as territorial compromise (better known as the land for
peace formula), the occupied territories, and Palestinian refugees are
considered by many to be the major obstacles to a comprehensive and
all-encompassing peace settlement between the Jewish State and her
neighbors. As always, for a true
understanding of these existential issues, history must be examined carefully.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, passed five months
after the end of the 1967 War, touched upon all of the above-mentioned issues,
among others, with its ultimate goal being the establishment of a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East. It
can be inferred, therefore, that the key issues mentioned in the Resolution
were, according to the Security Council, both the primary problems preventing
peace, and in fact, the main causes of war.
In order to analyze not only the relevance of Resolution 242, but also
its practical application, it is essential to examine the following key
issues:
Firstly, what were Israels legal borders prior to the 1967
War? For this, it will be necessary to
analyze not only the Mandate for Palestine, but also Resolution 181 the
Palestine Partition Plan and the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and
her neighbors following the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war.
Secondly, what is the United Nations? What authority do United Nations Resolutions
have in the international arena?
Thirdly, what were the main events leading up to the outbreak of
war on June 5, 1967? In regards to
Israels actions on June 5, 1967, can the war be defined as an offensive war or
a defensive war? In other words, who was
the aggressor and who was the victim?
Fourthly, who authored Resolution 242? What was their intent? What do the different clauses of the
Resolution mean and refer to, and how has the Resolution been interpreted by the
different parties involved?
While all of these questions will be considered and answered, they
merely provide the setting necessary to answer the central query of this
investigation: have the different parties involved in Resolution 242 adhered to
its principles according to international law?
Specifically, has Israel fulfilled her obligations, as required by the
Resolution?
In this paper, I will posit not only that Israel has fulfilled her
obligations as required by the Resolution, but also that Israel has adhered to
the Resolution above and beyond what was required of her, by international law
(and, indeed, by common sense).
Moreover, as a result of violations by the other parties involved,
Israel has been legally and morally absolved of any further obligation to this
Resolution.
To understand the present and be able to plot a course for the
future, one must delve deeply into the past.
Thus, this inquiry begins in San Remo, Italy in the year 1920.
Israels
Borders under International Law
The legal right of the Jewish People to the mandated territory of
Palestine was recognized under international law on April 24, 1920, at the San
Remo Peace Conference in San Remo, Italy.
Towards the end of World War I, Great Britain and France captured
several territories from the disintegrating Ottoman Empire, among them the
territory of Palestine, which did not exist [as a sovereign or even] as a
distinct and separate territorial unit within the empire at the time. At the end of the War, and with the
establishment of the League of Nations through the Treaty of Versailles, the
Allied Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) gathered together at San
Remo, Italy in order to discuss the implementation of the Treaty.[1]
The Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919 between the
Allied Powers and Germany, was the official peace treaty to end World War
I. Articles 1-26 of the Treaty became
known as the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was established to
promote international security and cooperation and to maintain international
peace between nations.[2] Article 22 of the Covenant authorized the
establishment of a system of Mandates for the supervision and governance of the
worlds remaining non-sovereign territories.
The purpose of these Mandates was to place each territory and its
population under the tutelage of an advanced nation, which would supervise the
development of the territory and its population until such a time as that
population could become an independent and responsible nation in its territory.[3]
At the San Remo Conference the following year, the Supreme Council
of the Principal Allied Powers, pursuant to the authority of Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, granted the Mandates of Palestine and
Mesopotamia to Great Britain, and the Mandate of Syria to France. The San Remo Resolution established that Palestine
would be a Jewish National Home, first as a mandatory territory, and then as an
independent entity. The Jewish People
were named as the national beneficiary of the Mandate, based upon both the
Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 and Article 22 of the Covenant. Thus, de jure sovereignty and legal
title over the Mandatory Territory of Palestine was transferred to the Jewish
People under international law.
Moreover, the British Government, as a result of the Balfour Declaration
(which had been a mere statement of intent when declared in 1917, but after San
Remo, had become anchored in international law) and as a result of having
received the responsibility as the Mandatory Power over Palestine, was under
obligation to facilitate the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine.[4]
Whereas the international trust known as the Mandate for Palestine
was established on April 24, 1920 at the San Remo Conference, the international
governing instrument also known as the Mandate for Palestine was officially
created on July 24, 1922, by the League of Nations. In its Preamble, the main text of the Balfour
Declaration was repeated, and stressed that the purpose of the Mandate for
Palestine was to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done
which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine
[5] Thus, the goal of the Mandate was to establish
a national home for the Jewish People, while the non-Jewish communities in the
Mandatory territory were not to have their civil or religious rights
impeded. It can be inferred from this
that while the Jewish People were endowed with political and national rights,
these non-Jewish communities were only acknowledged to have civil and religious
rights.
The Articles of the Mandate granted certain powers and authorities
to the British Government, but also placed several restrictions and
qualifications on that authority.
Article 5 forbade the ceding of any Palestine territory to the
government of any foreign power. Article
6 of the Mandate required the British Administration to facilitate Jewish
immigration and settlement by Jews on the land.
Article 15 forbade discrimination of any kind on the grounds of race,
religion or language. It also stated
that no person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his
religious belief. Article 25 allowed
the British Government to determine the fate of the area lying east of the
Jordan River (trans-Jordania) provided that the
British Government continued to abide by three other Articles of the Mandate, including
Article 15. Finally, Article 27 required that any modification of the terms of
the mandate must be subject to League of Nations approval.[6]
On September 16, 1922 Great Britain severed the portion of trans-Jordania from Mandatory Palestine, under Article 25, with
the consent of the League of Nations and created therefrom the Emirate of
Transjordan (now known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan). While Great Britain and the League of Nations
were certainly entitled to separate the lands lying east of the Jordan River
(constituting 77% of the Mandatory territory) from the rest of the Mandate, the
subsequent barring of Jewish immigration to those lands was a direct violation
of Article 15 of the Mandate for Palestine.
While the British could determine that the lands of trans-Jordania would no longer be part of the Jewish National
Home, they had no right under international law to bar Jewish immigration,
since such discrimination based on religion was strictly forbidden under the
Mandate.[7]
After the separation of trans-Jordania
from the Mandatory territory, only cis-Jordania
remained, this being the territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan
River, including the Golan Heights (included in the Mandatory Territory by the
Franco-British Boundary Convention of December 23, 1920) and of course Judea,
Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. From this
point in history and onwards, no other authorization for the modification of
the Mandate was approved by the League of Nations, as required by Article
27. Thus, in 1923, when Great Britain
ceded the Golan Heights to the French Mandate for Syria, it violated Articles 5
and 27 of the Mandate, thus rendering the transfer of that territory illegal
under international law.[8] When Syria was granted independence in 1946,
its territory included the Golan Heights; however this was a mere de facto
control, rather than a de jure possession.
When Great Britain decided to resign its position as Mandatory
trustee for the Mandate for Palestine in early 1947, the Mandate continued to
exist, however it lacked an official administrative authority. For this reason, the United Nations General
Assembly voted on and passed Resolution 181, famously known as the Palestine
Partition Plan, on November 29, 1947.
The Resolution called for the termination of the Mandate, and the
division of the remaining territory (22% of the original territory of the
Mandate for Palestine) into an independent Jewish State, an independent Arab
State, and a UN-administered Special International
Regime to oversee Jerusalem and its surrounding area.[9] This division of the Mandate was a direct
violation of Article 5 of the Mandate for Palestine, which forbade the ceding
of any Mandatory territory to a foreign power, and was therefore illegal under
international law. However, despite the
UNs desire to create a second Arab state out of the Mandatory territory, and
despite the inadequate and barely adjoining territories for a state which it
was granted, the Jewish leadership of Palestine accepted the Resolution, on the
implicit condition that the Arabs of Palestine would peacefully accept it
too. When the Arab leadership of
Palestine in addition to all of the Arab and (non-Arab) Muslim States with UN
membership at the time (such as Egypt, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Pakistan, and Yemen)[10]
rejected this Resolution and attacked the Jewish settlements of the Mandatory
territory, this Resolution ceased to be relevant. This is so for two reasons. Firstly, since the Mandate strictly forbade
the ceding of any Mandatory territory to a foreign power, the UN had no legal
right to vote on Resolution 181. Only Jewish
acquiescence to the Resolution could render it relevant and lawful, as only the
beneficiaries of the Mandate for Palestine could relinquish their rights to a
portion of it. Thus, despite the Jewish acceptance
of Resolution 181, the Arab rejection of the Resolution prevented it
from becoming legal and binding, as would be the case in any bilateral
agreement. A second reason for the
irrelevance of the Resolution is the nature of the legal authority of the General
Assembly. The General Assembly of the
United Nations is only endowed with the power of recommendation, thus its resolutions
purporting to affect member states are not legally binding upon those states under
international law. (This concept will be
expanded upon later.)
On May 14, 1948, under severe attacks by Arab forces in areas both
inside and outside the Partition Plan lines, the creation of the State of
Israel was announced by Jewish Agency Chairman David Ben Gurion,
later to be Israels first Prime Minister.
The Israeli leadership announced that the new State of Israel would
adhere to Resolution 181.[11] Several Arab states, including Egypt, Syria,
and Jordan, invaded the infant State of Israel with the intention of
annihilating it. By acting in such a
manner, these states and the Arabs within the Mandatory territory who had been
waging a war against the Jewish population therein since November 1947, justified Preamble request No. C [Section A (c)] of
Resolution 181, which requested that: The Security Council determine as a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance
with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement
envisaged by this resolution.[12]
When the Israeli War of Independence ended in 1949, the Jewish
State controlled a much larger territory than was envisioned by Resolution
181. However, the Gaza Strip was
conquered by Egypt, and Judea, Samaria, and the eastern half of Jerusalem were
captured by Jordanian forces. In yet
another violation of Resolution 181, which granted religious and minority
rights throughout the newly-partitioned land,[13]
the Jews who resided in communities in Gaza, Judea, Samaria, and eastern
Jerusalem were either massacred or expelled by their Arab conquerors. Yet it is worthy to note that since
Resolution 181 was neither accepted by the Arab side nor officially
implemented, the Mandate for Palestine was never legally
terminated. Thus, the State of Israel,
as the governing instrument of the Jewish People in the former Mandatory
territory, still retained the legal title to [albeit without possession of] the portions of Mandatory Palestine which had
been captured by force illegally by Egypt and Jordan. As Resolution 242 would later emphasize, the
acquisition of territory by war is inadmissible in regards to legal title. (The legal rule of jus ex injuria non oritur means that
no legal right can arise from a wrong.
In this case, Egypt and Jordan could not gain legal title as a result of
their illegal conquest and occupation of Gaza and Judea, Samaria and eastern
Jerusalem, respectively. Similarly,
Syria could not gain legal title over the Golan Heights due to that territorys
illegal transfer to the French Mandate for Syria in 1923.) The de facto
control of these territories had no effect whatsoever on the de jure
rights of the State of Israel to these territories.
The Armistice Agreements, signed between Israel and four Arab
States (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria) at the end of the war, defined
ceasefire lines for the relevant military forces, but were explicitly regarded
only as separation-of-forces lines, and not as final boundaries. Thus, for example, Article V, Paragraph 2 of
the Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement of February 24, 1949 stated: The
Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political
or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims
and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement
of the Palestine question.[14] (See Article II, Paragraph 2 of the
Lebanon-Israel, Syria-Israel, and Jordan-Israel Armistice Agreements for
similar clauses.) It should be noted
that at the end of the War, Israel had conquered portions of southern Lebanon
and northern Sinai, however it returned these
territories to Lebanon and Egypt, respectively, as part of the Armistice
Agreements. The Israeli leadership at
that time and afterwards expressed its willingness to have the ceasefire lines
formally and legally acknowledged as internationally-recognized boundaries,
however the Arab states refused this request, going so far as to make sure that
Israel was not even mentioned by name in the Armistice Agreements themselves
(although, out of linguistic necessity, the adjective Israeli was employed
but only once to describe Israels army in the Israel-Syria Armistice
Agreement; see Article V, Paragraph 1). Thus,
this Arab intransigence allowed Israel to retain its pre-War claims to the
territories of Gaza, Judea, Samaria and the Golan Heights, as only Israeli
acquiescence to the relinquishment of Jewish title to these territories could
turn the Arab de facto control into de jure possession and
sovereignty.
The United Nations
When the United Nations was formed in 1945, its main purpose was
declared: To
maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and
to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.[15] After having witnessed two gruesome World
Wars in the previous thirty years, there was a need for a strong international
organization which would promote peace and security among nations, and which
would and could resolve those disputes in a peaceful manner, if possible before
the outbreak of hostilities. The United
Nations was essentially meant to be a more effective version of the defunct
League of Nations, which had been unable to prevent the outbreak of World War
II.
The
United Nations is composed of two main bodies: the General Assembly and the
Security Council. The General Assembly
consists of all the member states of the United Nations. Each country represents one vote in the
General Assembly. The main powers of the
General Assembly are described in Chapter IV of the Charter of the United
Nations, which states: The General Assembly may consider the general principles
of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security,
including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments,
and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or
to the Security Council or to both.[16] And, the General Assembly may call the
attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger
international peace and security.[17] Thus, the General Assemblys main power is to
make recommendations to specific member states or to the Security Council. General Assembly resolutions are, therefore,
only recommendations, and not binding.
The second
and more powerful body of the United Nations is the Security Council. The Security Council comprises 15
members. Five countries (United States
of America, Britain, France, China and Russia) are permanent members and hold
veto powers. The other ten seats are
filled by member states, voted in by the General Assembly to serve two year
terms. The two main Chapters of the
Charter of the United Nations which are relevant in relation to the powers of
the Security Council are Chapters VI and VII.
Chapter VI deals with the pacific settlement of disputes. Security Council Resolutions passed under
chapter VI are merely the recommendations of the Security Council, and not
binding on the parties involved, much like resolutions made by the General
Assembly. Chapter VII, however,
describes the powers of the Security Council to use force in order to settle
disputes which endanger international peace and security. Article 41 of Chapter VII describes economic
sanctions and diplomatic measures which can be taken by the Security Council,
while Article 42 of Chapter VII authorizes the Security Council to use air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Resolutions made under Chapter VII are
binding on member states and if not followed, empower the Security Council to
sanction the use of force to implement them.
The
weight and severity of Security Council resolutions made under Chapter VII
imply that the Security Council must be very specific under which Chapter it is
passing a resolution. For example,
Chapter VII requires member states to contribute armed forces for a
multi-national fighting force, if so requested by the Security Council.[18] Member states, obviously, must know whether a
resolution requires them to contribute such armed forces. Furthermore, the purpose of a resolution
under Chapter VII is to threaten the use of force in order to frighten the
aggressor in the relevant conflict to cease its aggression. Therefore, it is vital that the aggressor
understand that force is being threatened.
For these reasons, Security Council resolutions, unless otherwise
stated, must be assumed to be passed under Chapter VI, for Chapter VII
resolutions logically require a precise indication that they are, indeed,
passed under Chapter VII. It is quite
clear, therefore, that Security Council Resolution 242 (to be analyzed in
detail later in this paper) was passed under Chapter VI, since no mention was
made of Articles relevant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus, Resolution 242 is merely a
recommendation of the Security Council, non-binding in its nature, and poses no
threat of the use of force against any side for failure to adhere to its
proposals. (In contrast, Security
Council Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990, which condemned the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, specifically stated that the Security Council was acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter, and set forth a number of actions to be taken against Iraq
by member states.[19])
The Six Day War
After their failed attempt to destroy the newborn Jewish State in
1948, the Arab states resorted to cross-border attacks throughout the
1950s. In 1956, in response to Egyptian
sponsorship of these terrorist raids and the Egyptian decision to illegally
close the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping, Israel
invaded the Sinai Peninsula and conquered it.
Under US and Soviet pressure, Israel withdrew from the Sinai several
months later, despite Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
Nassers repeated commitments to the destruction of the Jewish State.[20] The Israeli withdrawal was contingent on the
demilitarization of the Sinai and the reopening of the Straits of Tiran (which
was the gateway to the Gulf of Aqaba and, consequently, Israels port of Eilat) to Israeli shipping. A United Nations peacekeeping
force known as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed in the
Sinai Peninsula and in the Gaza Strip.
Throughout the 1960s, attacks on Israel continued, both from the
Jordanian-controlled West Bank by the newly established Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) and from the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights. In 1967, another high intensity phase of the
Arab-Israeli conflict loomed. In an act
of war, at the beginning of April 1967, the Syrian army launched a concentrated
artillery barrage against northern Israel and all but destroyed Kibbutz Gadot. Skirmishes
ensued between the air forces of Syria and Israel, with Israel emerging
victorious.[21] On May 16, 1967, Egypt demanded the
withdrawal of UNEF forces from the Sinai and Nasser subsequently sent over
100,000 soldiers into the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. The Syrian army, which sat atop the Golan
Heights, was positioned to launch a quick strike into northern Israel from its
strategic high ground. Lastly, the
Jordanian army was stationed throughout the strategic hills of Judea and
Samaria, overlooking the vulnerable coastal plain of Israel. At its narrowest point along the coastal
plain, an armored thrust by the Jordanian army could have cut the Jewish State
in half.[22] Egypt, Syria and Jordan formed a joint
command in order to coordinate their forces. In addition, the Iraqi army sent a
sizeable force of its army into Jordan in anticipation of the planned invasion
of Israel. In an act of war, Nasser once
again closed off the Straits of Tiran to Israel shipping. The United States Ambassador to the UN,
Arthur Goldberg, stressed that as a result of the Armistice Agreements, neither
Israel nor the Arab States possessed the right to exercise belligerent
rights. Thus, the Egyptian blockade of
the Straits of Tiran was illegal under international law. Furthermore, the leaders of these Arab
countries publicly announced their intentions to destroy the Jewish State and
throw its Jews into the sea. On May 25,
Nasser declared that the goal of the Arab countries in any war with Israel
would be to exterminate the State of Israel for all time.[23]
The Arab States were undoubtedly encouraged by the reaction, or
lack thereof, of the worlds governments, who stood by silently as Israel was
surrounded on every side by enemies who sought her destruction. The Security Councils inability to take any
action to avert the impending hostilities stood in stark contradiction to its raison
dκtre, as its primary responsibility was to maintain international peace
and security.[24] (Ironically, other than weak draft
resolutions which were adopted by the Security Council in the days prior to the
outbreak of war and which lacked any real content which would deter the Arab
armies, the only concrete action taken by the United Nations prior to the war
was the evacuation of UNEF from the Sinai Peninsula, which only accelerated the
countdown to, and the outbreak of, the June 1967 war.) Moreover, U Thant, the Secretary-General of
the UN, did not even make a personal appeal to Nasser following the evacuation
of UNEF because he was told he would be rebuffed if he attempted such an
appeal. Instead, Thant, the highest UN
official, chose to do nothing. Member
states of the General Assembly and of the Security Council could have called
for a meeting of the Security Council due to the obvious threats to peace and
international security, but chose not to for over a week.[25]
The removal of UNEF was a critical juncture in the inevitable
spiral towards war. Firstly, if UNEF was
considered critical to maintain the peace after the Sinai Campaign of 1956, its
removal by Egypt in 1967 obviously constituted a serious threat to peace. The Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai
following the 1956 war was contingent on the demilitarization of the peninsula
and the deployment of international forces.
In 1957, the Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Abba Eban,
asked the UN Secretary-General at the time, Dag Hammarskjold, what would happen
in the event Egypt decided to evict UNEF and remilitarize the Sinai. The Secretary-General assured Israel that the
UN could invoke a procedure, whereby the General Assembly would be convened to
deal with the issue. In 1967, U Thant
assembled the countries who contributed troops to UNEF in order to inform them
of the Egyptian demand to remove UNEF from the Sinai. Not a single country decided to bring the
issue to the attention of the General Assembly.[26] Israel saw the procedure it was promised
would be invoked for its security ignored on the international stage. This contributed in no small part to the
military action eventually taken by Israel.
From mid-May, with the reintroduction of Egyptian forces into the
Sinai and the withdrawal of UNEF, Israel felt the existential danger facing it
begin to mount and the need to respond was urgent. Yet, despite an official request for a public
US guarantee of Israels security, the United States and President Lyndon
Johnson remained mute. The only message
conveyed by the US government was its expectation that Israel take no action
which might increase tension in the region without prior consultation. Both Britain and France similarly refused
entreaties for public support of Israels security. Israel had no choice but to mobilize its
reserves, which comprise the bulk of its army, even at the risk of US
displeasure. 80,000 reservists were
called up, at a staggering cost to the Israeli economy.[27] The ensuing three weeks of waiting, while
Egypt massed its forces in Sinai and Israel mobilized its reserve forces, were
costly and crippling to the Israeli economy.
With its reserves massed, the Israeli economy came to a standstill. The Israeli Cabinet, meeting on the night of
June 4, voted for a preemptive strike, after deciding that the armies of Egypt,
Syria and Jordan intended to commence a multi-front attack which threatened the
existence of Israel. It was decided that
a military strike would be launched to prevent the impending attack.[28]
Israel launched its preemptive attack on the following morning,
June 5, 1967, and successfully destroyed the Egyptian Air Force, most of whose
planes were still on the ground.[29] Israel also passed on a message to Jordan to
warn that country against engaging in hostilities against the Jewish
State. Jordan was told that if it
refrained from aggression, it would not be attacked. Nevertheless, Jordan ignored this warning,
and commenced artillery barrages against Israel. [30] By mid-day, the air forces of Egypt, Syria
and Jordan had been nearly obliterated by the Israeli Air Force.[31] Without air cover, Egyptian forces in the
Sinai were at a significant disadvantage and within a several days were in full
retreat. In a mere six days of warfare,
Israel captured the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, eastern Jerusalem and the
Old City, Judea, Samaria, and the Golan Heights. In fact, by the end of the fourth day of the
war, every territory previously mentioned except the Golan Heights had already
been captured. Fierce debate raged in
the Israeli Cabinet over whether to attack and capture the Golan Heights in
response to the continuous Syrian shelling of Israels northern settlements
throughout the first four days of the war.
Israel feared possible Soviet intervention, but ultimately attacked and
captured the Golan Heights during the final two days of the war. Despite the preemptive nature of the outbreak
of war, Israel only fired the first shot on the Egyptian front. Against Jordan and Syria, Israel only
commenced hostilities after it was first attacked by those countries.[32]
During the six days of warfare, the Security Council issued four
resolutions calling for a ceasefire (Resolutions 233, 234, 235, and 236). The fighting officially ceased towards the
evening hours of June 10, 1967. In the
war, Israel suffered approximately 700 dead and over 2,500 wounded. The combined armies of Egypt, Syria and
Jordan suffered approximately 18,000 dead and nearly 23,000 injured.[33] Estimates show that over 200,000 Palestinians
fled from their homes in Judea, Samaria and Gaza as a result of the war. However, while Israel did not stop these Palestinians from fleeing, it
also did not forcibly expel them from their homes.[34] The war changed the face of the Middle East
and while there were several skirmishes in the ensuing months, including the
sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by
Egypt in late October, the major fighting ahead lay not on the battlefield, but
in the halls of the UN.
Legal Warfare
Before
discussion of Resolution 242 can begin, it is important to attempt a definition
of the type of war waged by Israel in June 1967. Was this a war of aggression, clearly
forbidden under international law? Or,
was this a war of national defense, despite the preemptive nature of the wars
outbreak? Specifically, who was the aggressor
in the Six Day War, and who was the victim? First, the UN Charter must be analyzed for the
necessary background to understand the legal justification for Israels strike
on June 5. In Article 2, the Charter
presents several major principles of international law upon which the
newly-created United Nations would be based.
Paragraph 4 of Article 2 states: All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.[35] Article 51, which is found in Chapter VII,
acknowledges that: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as
it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.[36]
Secondly, it must be understood that while war is offensive by its
nature, it can nevertheless be undertaken for defensive reasons, and therefore,
bend its offensive character to a defensive rationale. Thus war can be broken into two main
categories: offensive and defensive.
Offensive warfare is forbidden under international law. It is expansionist in its nature, such as the
wars of conquest waged by Nazi Germany to gain lebensraum for the German
people in Eastern Europe. Defensive
warfare can be broken into three main sub-categories: preventive, preemptive
and responsive. Preventive or
preventative war is
initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is
inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk.[37] Israels attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor
at Osirik in 1981 was such an attack, destroying the
growing nuclear potential of Saddam Hussein, albeit
before that potential nuclear force was ready to be harnessed effectively. Israel was not under any imminent threat from
Iraq in 1981, but took preventative action in order to limit Iraqs ability to
threaten Israel in the future.
Preemptive war is defined as an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible
evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.[38] Israels actions on June 5, 1967 fit this
definition closely, as the actions and declarations of Arab leaders and their
armies indicated that a military conflict was imminent. The most classic type of defense, however, is
responsive defense, which is the type
of response to aggression explicitly sanctioned by Article 51 of the UN
Charter. It is a war waged in response
to an attack, such as Israels response to the 1973 surprise attack of Egypt
and Syria in the Yom Kippur War.
While the UN Charter prohibits the use of force by
any state against the territorial integrity or political independence of
another state, it recognizes two exceptions.
The first is the use of force by the UN itself in order to enforce
international law. This type of force
can be responsive, as was the case in the First Gulf War in 1991, or even
preventive. This right was granted to
the UN under Article 42 of Chapter VII.
The second exception is the inherent self-defense acknowledged to be the
right of every nation, mentioned in Article 51 of Chapter VII. It relies on the just war theory, which
emphasizes national defense as the prime justification for waging war.[39]
The
Arab states, through their declarations of intent to destroy Israel, the
blockade of the Straits of Tiran, the expulsion of UNEF, the artillery barrage
of northern Israel, joint military pacts and the amassing of forces along
Israels borders, clearly violated Article 2(4) by threatening and even using
force against the encircled Jewish State.
Yet, because Israel was the country to fire the first official shots
of the Six Day War (and even then, only on the Egyptian front), it has instead
been accused of violating Article 2, and thus, of being the aggressor. Yet it is naοve and immoral to assume that
the term aggressor applies only to the side who takes the first offensive
action. Circumstances must be taken into
account in order to understand what events led up to hostilities. Israels actions were a defensive measure of
a beleaguered state against
military threats which overtly endangered its territorial integrity and
political independence. So while the
Arabs states were violating Article 2(4), Israel was upholding its inherent
right to self-defense under Article 51.
The language of Article 51 makes it clear that Article 51 is not granting
this right to nations, but rather merely acknowledging that this right
exists for every nation. It is a right
that cannot be taken away even by international law, for no nation can be
expected to sit idly by while its existence is endangered.
Yet, in the weeks leading up to the official outbreak of warfare on
June 5, Israel did sit idly by, restraining itself from military action while
vainly waiting for international intervention.
And while Article 51 states that the use of force for self-defense can
be undertaken until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security, the Security Council took no such measures in the weeks
preceding the war, when it was clear that Arab belligerency was leading the
region towards another war, and endangering the existence of the State of
Israel. Such action by the Security
Council in those critical weeks could perhaps have prevented the outbreak of
war, and indeed is the main purpose for the existence of the United Nations and
its Security Council. So while it is
true that Israel fired the first official shots of the Six Day War, its
actions were justified by a natural right of nations which supersedes
international law. Furthermore, when the
international institutions that exist to maintain international peace and
security shirk those responsibilities, no sovereign nation is required to sit
by and wait to be attacked. Israel
waited for international intervention to curb Arab belligerency and when such
intervention never came, Israel was certainly not required to wait for an
imminent attack.
In the modern age, anticipatory self-defense is critical for the
security of states, as the speed and destructive capacity of modern weapons has
increased the need and urgency for preventive and preemptive action. It is a vital right of a State to respond
with force to an imminent threat. The
belligerent speeches and actions of Arab leaders, including threats to destroy
the Jewish State, the military pacts made between Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and
the strengthening of Arab forces along the borders of Israel, all pointed to an
imminent attack on the besieged Jewish State, and justified the use of force in
order to preempt such an attack.[40]
(It is noteworthy that in the hours before the outbreak of the 1973 Yom Kippur
War, Israel did not take preemptive action as a result of American pressure,
and instead waited for Egypt and Syria to attack first. The loss of life and initial losses of
territory in the first days of that war expose the stupidity and immorality of
waiting to be fired upon in order to avoid being labeled the aggressor.)
While it has just been argued that Israel possessed the inherent
right of self-defense against an imminent attack, it can also be posited that a
constant state of warfare has existed between Israel and her neighbors since
1948, notwithstanding the 1949 Armistice Agreements, which sought to end the
active state of belligerency between the different states. This state of warfare is an ongoing one,
punctuated by several high intensity phases, such as the 1956 Sinai Campaign,
the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In between these major engagements, the
conflict is waged at a low intensity level, through cross-border terrorist
raids, the use of proxy terrorist organizations, closing or diverting of
waterways, and constant diplomatic onslaught.
And while Israel surely fired the first official shots of the Six Day
War, this was merely a belated response to years of ongoing low intensity
conflict waged and supported by those same Arab states, and not in fact a
preemptive attack. Article 51 would therefore
apply even more forcefully in this context, since it speaks of self-defense in
the event of an armed attack, which is considered by some to mean that self-defense can only be used after an armed attack
has already occurred. The aforementioned
actions undertaken by the Arab states (the remilitarization of the Sinai, the
closing of the Straits of Tiran, and the artillery barrage on northern Israel,
to state a few) can all be seen as acts of overt aggression which legitimize
any offensive action taken by Israel.
That Israel waited until June 5 to respond to acts of aggression which
occurred weeks beforehand only underlines Israels desire to avoid armed
conflict if possible, and its hope that the international institutions in
charge of maintaining peace and security would indeed attempt to fulfill
their duties.
Regarding the legality of Israels offensive actions on June 5,
1967, it is ultimately unimportant whether the outbreak of war on June 5 is
considered to be the eruption of a new war (and therefore Israels actions were
preemptive) or whether it was simply the continuation of a 19 year old state of
warfare (in which case Israels actions were a belated response to ongoing Arab
aggression). The existence of Israel was
threatened openly and overtly by the Arab states surrounding it in 1967, and in
accordance with common sense and the inherent right of nations to
self-defense, Israel chose to act first, in order to strategically (and
tactically) surprise its enemies.
Whether Israel acted preemptively to prevent an imminent attack or acted
belatedly after weeks and months of Arab aggression ultimately leads to the
same conclusion: Israel was justified in taking offensive action against the
existential military threat facing it on the morning of June 5, 1967.
Interpretation of Resolution 242
Now that
the legal context of Resolution 242 is clear, namely that it is merely a
recommendation and has no binding authority to impose obligations on any of the
parties involved, and the historical context leading up to and including the
Six Day War has been explained, a proper analysis of the Resolution may be
undertaken. The text of the Resolution
is important enough to the current inquiry to bear repeating in full:
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242
(22 November 1967).
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave
situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace
in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their
acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to
act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter:
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of
Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in
the Middle East which should include the application of both the following
principles:
(i) Withdrawal of
Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of
belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and
their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from
threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity:
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation
through international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the
refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial
inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through
measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to
designate a Special Representative to proceed to them Middle East to establish
and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement
and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance
with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to
report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special
Representative as soon as possible.
In the days and months following the Six Day War, the main issue
facing the international community was whether to pass Resolutions aimed at a
short-term solution to the most recent outbreak of war, or whether to attempt
to move resolutely in the direction of a solution to the conflict and a lasting
peace.[41] Understood in this light, it can be stated
that the main concern of Resolution 242 was peace, not territorial withdrawal
as is commonly assumed and claimed.
Thus, for example, the Resolution called for the establishment of a
just and lasting peace in the Middle East and for the termination of all
claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in
the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force.
The Resolution strove to achieve a lasting peace between Israel and her
Arab neighbors, and addressed the Arab refusal to recognize Israeli sovereignty
and right to exist as one of the major obstacles to that peace.
It must be stressed that the United Nations is not an institution
of justice; rather it is one of compromise.
It is composed of both democracies and dictatorships, and its main
purpose as an organization is the maintenance of international peace and security,
and the prevention of war. To pass a
Security Council Resolution, at least 9 out of 15 countries must vote in the
affirmative, while none of the permanent members decide to use their veto
power. On a politically charged issue
such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the US and the USSR would naturally struggle
to find common ground. Therefore, the
wording of certain clauses of Resolution 242, authored by Lord Hugh Caradon, the British Ambassador to the UN, was purposely
made ambiguous so that it would be possible to garner the necessary votes for
passage in the Security Council. For
the five months between June and November 1967, much debate ensued over
possible draft resolutions, and several were submitted and turned aside. Caradon did not
create a new resolution; rather he borrowed from other proposals and attempted
to create a synthesis that would acceptable to all sides, and especially to the
US and the USSR. The final resolution
was unanimously accepted on November 22, 1967.[42]
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the
Middle East
The United Nations directly contributed to the grave situation in
the Middle East by withdrawing UNEF and not even bothering to summon the
General Assembly to debate the matter, as was previously promised to
Israel. The UN proved itself unable and
unwilling to take any meaningful action to prevent or even delay the noose that
was slowly tightening around the Jewish State in the last weeks of May and
first days of June 1967. Opening the
Resolution with a statement such as this displays a moral cowardice on the part
of the Security Council by failing to admit the major part played by it and the
UN as a whole in the acceleration towards open warfare.
Just and Lasting Peace
The cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict has evolved over the
years. While Resolution 242 implies, as
Arab leaders since the Six Day War have claimed, that the main cause of the
continuing conflict between Israel and her neighbors is the Arab loss of
territory in that war, logic dictates that there is a more fundamental
reason. The Arab loss of territory in
the 1967 War was certainly not the cause for the outbreak of that war, nor
could the lost territories of 1967 have been the root cause of the 1948
War. However, Arab leaders since 1967
have repeatedly proclaimed that peace with Israel is possible, if only Israel
would return all of the territories that it captured in the 1967 War. Logic, on the other hand, dictates that a
just and lasting peace is only possible if measures taken to secure that
peace are relevant to solving the root cause of the conflict. Since the territory of the 1967 War is
clearly not the root cause of the conflict, the relinquishment of that
territory will certainly not resolve the conflict. Nevertheless, in the flawed UN analysis of
the root cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israels territorial victories in
1967 were intimately tied to the resolution of the conflict.
Inadmissibility of the Acquisition of Territory by War
This clause of the Resolution is interesting because while it seems
to be directed at and critical of Israel, and in fact, that was the intent of
the Resolutions authors, in actuality this clause is an unwitting criticism of
the unlawful acquisitions of the Gaza Strip and Judea, Samaria, and eastern
Jerusalem by Egypt and Jordan, respectively, in their illegal offensive war of
1948 against the newborn Jewish State. (Syria, as previously stated, illegally acquired the Golan Heights
in 1923 when that territory was severed from the Mandate for Palestine by the
British Government and transferred to the French Mandate for Syria.) Thus, Israels reacquisition of these
territories in its defensive war of 1967 was legal under international
law. Egypt, Jordan and Syria, while
having effected de facto control over these territories until 1967,
could not effect de jure sovereignty under
international law. These territories
were always intended to be part of the Jewish National Home envisioned by the
Mandate for Palestine, and Israel, as the legal repository of the national
rights bestowed by the Mandate for Palestine, is the only country that can
legally claim de jure sovereignty over these territories. Israels lawful claim to these territories
was not diminished despite their capture and illegal occupation by Arab
armies. The reunification of the entire
western portion of the Mandate for Palestine after the 1967 war legally, albeit
belatedly, completed the original vision of the Mandate.
Withdrawal from Territories
During the numerous negotiations in the weeks leading up to the
passing of Resolution 242, one of the main issues, if not the central one, was
the issue of the territories which had been conquered by Israel in the
war. The Arabs demanded full Israeli
withdrawal from all the territories captured in the war, while Israel was
willing to consider partial withdrawal, under certain conditions, linked to a
comprehensive peace settlement with her Arab neighbors. An influential factor as far as members of
the Security Council were concerned was King Husseins hint that the problems
of the region could be resolved if only Israel would withdraw from all the
territory it had captured. Only then,
according to the Jordanian monarch, could the Arab States recognize Israels
right to exist.[43]
A critical argument arose from the text of the Resolution regarding
the exact wording of Paragraph 1(i): Withdrawal of
Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict. Several members of the Security Council
wanted the qualifying terms all or the inserted before the word
territories, in order to specify that Israel would be required to withdraw
from all territories it had captured in the war. The United States and Israel demanded that
the phrase remain ambiguous in order to leave room for negotiations. The Soviets and even Lord Caradon wished to add the aforementioned qualifying terms,
but in the end they relented. It was
understood within the Security Council that different member states would
interpret the text of the Resolution in different ways, but in order to reach a
consensus, the Resolution needed to remain vague. The Arab states understood from Lord Caradon that regardless of the language of the Resolution,
the meaning of its text was total Israeli withdrawal. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, emphasized that in the opinion of Israel, the
resolution called on the Arabs to make peace in order to reclaim lost
territories. Furthermore, he pointed out
that every word which was or was not inserted into the Resolution was
deliberate, and that if the qualifying words the or all are not in the
Resolution, then they were not meant to be there. Britain, for its part, refused to publicly
clarify or explain the text of the Resolution.
It merely explained that the text was deliberately ambiguous in order to
assure its passage in the Security Council, and that while the text was not
perfect, it tried to be fair, just and impartial. Despite the vast differences of
interpretation between the numerous parties involved, all fifteen members of
the Security Council voted for the Resolution on November 22, 1967.[44]
Lord Caradon
was interviewed in February 1973 by the Israeli radio service Kol Israel. In the
interview he was asked to clarify the significance of the missing definite article
the before the word territories. He
answered as follows:
"The purposes are
perfectly clear, the principle is stated in the preamble, the
necessity for withdrawal is stated in the operative section. And then the essential phrase which is not sufficiently
recognized is that withdrawal should take place to secure and recognized
boundaries, and these words were very carefully chosen: they have to be secure
and they have to be recognized. They
will not be secure unless they are recognized.
And that is why one has to work for agreement. This is essential. I would defend absolutely what we did. It was not for us to lay down exactly where
the border should be. I know the 1967
border very well. It is not a
satisfactory border, it is where troops had to stop in
1947, just where they happened to be that night, that is not a permanent
boundary... "[45]
The
intent of Lord Caradon here is clear. He viewed
withdrawal as a necessary component of a comprehensive settlement, but not a
complete withdrawal to the 1949 Armistice Lines, which were dangerously
vulnerable and not permanent international borders to begin with.
Despite the clear indication by the architects of the Resolution
that the qualifying words the and all were deliberately left out of the
Resolution, it has been pointed out that in the French-language version of the
Resolution the phrase from territories was translated as des territoires. This
literally re-translates into English as from the territories but
idiomatically re-translates as from the territories or from
territories. However, this is a result
of the grammatical rules of the French language, which do not permit the use of
the proposition from together with its intended object, without the insertion
of the definite article the. Thus, the
English-language phrase from territories cannot be translated into French,
except as des territoires.[46] Furthermore, it should be noted that the
negotiations regarding the Resolution were conducted in English, and the
original text of the draft resolution which was submitted was also in English. The French-language version was only meant to
be an exact translation of the English-language version, and therefore, cannot
bestow any alternate meaning other than that intended by the English-language
version.[47]
It is also important to point out that it is the withdrawal of
Israeli armed forces that is the main requirement, but not necessarily
the withdrawal of Israelis from these territories. Thus, the building and expansion of Israeli
settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza in no way violates the Resolution. In addition, the rights bestowed upon the
Jewish people for settlement on the lands of the Mandate never ceased to be
applicable since Judea, Samaria and Gaza could not be legally annexed by Jordan
and Egypt, respectively. Therefore, even
if it could be argued that this clause of the Resolution referred not only to
Israel armed forces, but even to Israeli civilians, it would
still be an irrelevant clause, since this Resolution has no legal power to
cancel out a provision of the Mandate for Palestine.
Secure and Recognized Boundaries
Between the 1949 Armistice Agreements and the outbreak of the 1967
War, Israel had neither secure nor recognized boundaries. As previously stated, the 1949 Armistice
Lines were not permanent borders, rather only ceasefire lines. All the sides involved accepted that these
were not international borders between nations.
Although Israel made overtures to each of her neighbors, proposing a
peace agreement with each in exchange for recognition and transformation of the
ceasefire lines into permanent international borders, these overtures were
rejected. The vulnerability of these
borders is evident from several perspectives.
Firstly, the Syrian army was entrenched on the strategic high ground of
the Golan Heights. It could and did
attack Israeli farmers and settlements in the Hula Valley and around Lake Kinneret. The Syrian
army could reach the reach major Israeli cities in the north of the country
within a matter of hours. The formidable
Egyptian army in Gaza sat only tens of kilometers from Tel Aviv. More critical, though, was Israels strategic
vulnerability in the center of the country.
At its narrowest point, near the coastal town of Netanya, the width of
Israel was a mere 15 kilometers.
Moreover, the Judean and Samarian hills towered over Israels entire
coastal plain. All of its major
population centers were at risk.
Israels border with Jordan, along the outskirts of the Judean and
Samarian hills, was a long and arcing border, with no fence. Terrorist infiltration from this indefensible
frontier became the norm during the 1950s and 1960s. These intrinsic Israeli strategic weaknesses
substantially influenced the Arab states to continue adopting a belligerent
stance regarding Israel. Despite their
loss in 1948 and Israels show of military superiority in the 1956 Sinai
Campaign, the Arab states still saw Israel as vulnerable and therefore
continued to strive for her destruction.
Resolution 242 recognized that Israels vulnerable borders were a
major cause of the continued aggression of her Arab neighbors, and therefore
sought to emphasize that secure and recognized boundaries are a vital component
for achieving a just and lasting peace.
This statement was also a tacit acknowledgment of the fact that the 1949
Armistice Lines were neither secure boundaries (despite Israels victory in
1967), nor were they recognized boundaries (since the 1949 Armistice Lines were
merely ceasefire lines, and not internationally recognized borders).
A deeper analysis of the two concepts of secure and recognized
boundaries reveals that these two concepts are, in actuality, antithetical to
one another, as a result of the consistent hostility and destructive intentions
of Israels neighbors. Boundaries
considered by Israel to be secure would not be recognized by her neighbors. Yet the boundaries, if any, that these
countries would be willing to recognize for Israel would in no way be definable
as secure.
The next issue in this line of logic is which concept, secure or
recognized, takes precedence over the other.
The UN Charter presupposes the inherent right of states for security and
self-preservation. Every state is
naturally most concerned with its own preservation. Furthermore, whereas the existence of
recognized borders is mainly a legal matter and largely dependent on the
acquiescence of others, the existence of secure boundaries is solely a
military matter, dependent on geography and ones own national resources and
will. Thus, secure and recognized do not carry equal importance, legally or
morally, and the concept of secure boundaries must take precedence over the
concept of recognized boundaries.[48]
Freedom of Navigation through International Waterways
This clause was directed solely at the government of Egypt, which
had blocked Israeli shipping in the Straits of Tiran both in 1956 and in 1967,
in blatant disregard of international law.
According to international law, the blockade of international waterways
is a casus belli. The re-opening of
these international waterways was required by international law regardless of
Resolution 242. This clause was
fulfilled by Egypt, although it must be remembered that by the end of the Six
Day War, the Israeli Defense Forces were entrenched on the eastern bank of the
Suez Canal. Whether Egypt ended the
blockade as a result of the IDF presence or because of a desire to adhere to
Resolution 242 is debatable. Although,
judging by Egyptian disregard for Resolution 242 in starting a new war against
Israel in October 1973, it can be assumed that honoring the Resolution was
never a real consideration of the Egyptian leadership. In fact, had the 1973 Yom Kippur War not been
based on strategically surprising Israel with the outbreak of warfare, it is
highly probable that this war too would have been preceded by a blockade of
international waterways.
Refugees
Before 1967, the refugee problem was the oft-repeated cause of
the conflict according to Arab leaders.
Once again, this cause is also not the main source of the conflict,
since there was no refugee problem prior to the 1948 War. Obviously, the existence of refugees could
not have been the source of that first Arab-Israeli war.
Despite the above, Resolution 242 affirmed the necessity of
achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.[49] It is therefore necessary to understand the
nature of the refugees referred to by the Resolution. The Arab refugees of the 1948 War were told
to leave by their own leadership in order keep them out of harms way from the
impending Arab invasion of the newly-declared Jewish State. Undoubtedly, some Arabs were driven from
their homes as a result of the warfare being waged in the country at the time,
however the complete blame placed on Israel by the Arab world for the refugee
problem is a political machination used to defame and weaken the Jewish State. [50]
To discuss the refugees of the 1948 War, it is first necessary to
refer to General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948. This resolution called for the creation of
the Conciliation Commission, and discussed the international regime of
Jerusalem and the return of refugees.
The job of the Conciliation Commission was to assist the Governments
and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding
between them.[51] In Paragraph 11, the General Assembly
resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace
with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at
the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the
property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property
which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good
by the Governments or authorities responsible [and] instructs the Conciliation
Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social
rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain
close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine
Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the
United Nations. While once again it
must be pointed out that General Assembly resolutions are merely
recommendations, much can be learned from an analysis of the language of
Paragraph 11. Firstly, it was accepted
by the General Assembly that a condition for the return of a refugee to Israel
was that refugees desire to live at peace.
Israel was under no obligation to permit refugees to return who were
unwilling to accept the State of Israels right to exist, and who were
unwilling to live at peace with their Jewish neighbors. Secondly, since the general term refugee
was used, it can be argued that the provisions of Paragraph 11, specifically
the stipulation dealing with the compensation [that] should be paid for the
property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to
property, also apply to the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Arab
countries, who were expelled by their hosts after the Israeli victory in the
1948 War of Independence. However, the
rights of the Jewish refugees of the 1948 War were never realized. The fact that the newborn State of Israel
spent much time, money and effort to absorb and integrate the hundreds of
thousands of diverse Jews who had been expelled from several Arab countries did
not absolve those Arab states who had affected their expulsion from paying due
monetary compensation for property and assets which had been damaged, stolen,
or just left behind in fear.
In order to continue to use the refugees as a political weapon
against Israel, the Arab countries had to maintain them as refugees, denying to
them the ability to become citizens of those Arab countries in which they
currently resided (Jordan was the lone exception to this). That the 650,000 Arab refugees of the 1948
War were not absorbed into the tens of millions of Arabs spanning over 20
countries is proof enough of the unwillingness of the Arab world to allow the
refugees to integrate into their societies, rather preferring to use them as a
weapon against Israel. The Arab states
rejected the 1949 proposal of the Security Council for investigating the
plausibility of resettling the refugees throughout the Middle East, and reacted
with equal fury at the 1959 suggestion by the UN Secretary-General of a
rehabilitation program for the refugees.[52] The Arab aim was not to settle the refugees,
but rather to cultivate them, as a useful weapon against Israel. Unfortunately, the United Nations has
facilitated this aim over the years.
The Palestinian refugee problem is unique in the world. In 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was formed. Its purpose was to deal solely with the Arab refugees
of the 1948 War, while every other refugee population in the world was to be dealt
with by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). To highlight the absurdity of this situation,
it is useful to note that, by 2010, while UNHCRs 6,600 employees deal with
approximately 34 million refugees in 110 countries,[53]
UNRWAs 30,000 employees deal with approximately 4.7 million refugees in a mere
5 geographically adjacent locations (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and the West
Bank).[54] Thus, the ratio of refugee to UNHCR worker
is 5151:1, while the ratio of Palestinian refugee to UNRWA worker is
156:1. The primary purpose of UNRWA in
actuality is to perpetuate the Palestinian refugee problem, while ensuring that
the refugees continue to reside in their camps and develop enduring hostility
against Israel. In fact, in 1982, UNRWA released
a report admitting that its educational institution in Siblin,
Lebanon had been in fact a military training base for PLO terrorists for the
previous two years![55]
It is also worth noting that the Palestinian refugees are the only
refugees in the world whose status is hereditary. While every other refugee population in the
world, such as the millions of displaced persons after the Second World War,
has decreased with the passage of time, the Palestinian refugee population
continually increases. Therefore, those
650,000 refugees from 1948 have today become millions. The Arab worlds demand that these refugees
be allowed to return to the State of Israel, known as the Right of Return,
therefore becomes a powerful weapon, as an influx of that magnitude would cause
the demographic destruction of the Jewish State. This would be in violation of Paragraph 11 of
Resolution 194, which required that those returning should and desiring to
live at peace with their neighbours should be
permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date. The Right of Return, being a weapon for the
demographic destruction of Israel, fits neither the live at peace clause nor
the earliest practicable date clause.
There is no practical, let alone moral, way for Israel to accept and
enable its own demise.
The influx of millions of Palestinian Arabs into Israel would
demographically destroy the Jewish State.
No clause of a Security Council Resolution (especially a recommendatory
one under Chapter VI, and not even a mandatory one under Chapter VII) can
legally obligate a state to undertake actions which endanger its political
independence or territorial integrity. The
refugee clause of Security Council Resolution 242 has, unfortunately, never
been used to level criticism and blame against the Arab states, due to their
refusal to integrate the Palestinian Arabs into their countries. Such integration would not cause the
demographic destruction of these countries, virtually all of whom are
dictatorships and not affected by demographic fluctuations.
Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political
independence of every State in the area, through measures including the
establishment of demilitarized zones
The UN acted with particular disgrace by including this clause in
Resolution 242. One of the main causes
in the spiral towards war in May and June 1967 was the evacuation of UNEF and
the collapse of the demilitarized Sinai.
Neither of these serious violations of the terms of Israels original
withdrawal from Sinai following the 1956 Sinai Campaign even merited a
gathering of the General Assembly. The
UN stood by and watched events unfold, seemingly to Israels peril. Israels territory and political independence
were directly threatened by the disintegration of the demilitarized Sinai. Moreover, the UN ignored explicit promises
made to Israel regarding the procedures to be taken in the event that the Sinai
was remilitarized. The expectation that
Israel was once again supposed to trust in internationally-administered
demilitarized zones was ludicrous considering the circumstances that led to the
outbreak of war in the first place.
Aftermath of Resolution 242
After the passing of Resolution 242, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon
accepted the resolution as a basis for negotiation, while Syria rejected it.[56] It seems apparent that their massive defeat
in the Six Day War caused these states to reevaluate their strategic approach
to their conflict with Israel. While they still wished to eliminate the Jewish
State, they understood that there was no simple military solution while Israel
held on to the territories it liberated in 1967. They decided to resort to the use of
political pressure against the Jewish State. That pressure could be brought to
bear against Israel most effectively by the West, and specifically by
America. The Arab states avoided public
declarations calling for the destruction of Israel, and instead began to
present the Israeli triumphs of the 1967 War as examples of Israeli
expansionism. Therefore, in line with
the UN Charters declaration and Resolution 242s reiteration of the principle
of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, the Arab States
presented themselves to the world, not as the aggressors in the 1967 war, but
rather as the victims.[57]
Jordan accepted the Resolution on February 25, 1968. King Hussein understood the Resolution to
mean Israel would withdraw from all of the territories it had captured in exchange
for an Arab promise for peace. Egypt
accepted the Resolution privately on February 20, 1968, but only publicly
announced so in March. Israel for its
part accepted the Resolution privately on February 12, 1968, but only made the
announcement public on May 1 of that year.
Syria, however, refused to accept the Resolution, making a public
statement to that effect the day after the passage of the Resolution in the
Security Council. Syria later accepted
the Resolution, as part of Resolution 338 which followed its defeat at the
hands of Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
The PLO similarly rejected Resolution 242 the day after its passage by
claiming that it failed to decisively state the right of Palestinian refugees
to return to their homes and ignored the right of self-determination for the
Palestinian people.[58]
Despite having accepted Resolution 242, Egypt, in conjunction with
Syria (who had not, as yet, accepted the Resolution) launched a coordinated
surprise attack against Israel in October 1973, which came to be known as the
Yom Kippur War. This attack surely
violated Resolution 242, and thereby absolved Israel of any obligation to
continue to adhere to the Resolution. By
attacking Israel, these two countries thereby attempted by military means to
deprive Israel of Resolution 242s recommendation for negotiations leading to
secure and recognized boundaries. It
can therefore be argued that the aggressors in that war thereby forfeited their
recommended benefits under the Resolution.
(Even if one argues that countries should also abide by non-binding
Security Council resolutions, despite there being no basis for this position in
international law, or that by agreeing to accept Resolution 242, Israel caused
that Resolution to become binding on itself, it can be countered that this
surprise attack in 1973 absolved Israel of any obligation to the
Resolution. It has also been argued that
UN Resolutions are binding on each party separately (independently) and not interdependently. However, there is no logic in such an
argument, for if one countrys compliance with a Resolution has no bearing or
connection with the compliance and actions of other countries involved, then
there is no incentive for any side to abide by international agreements and
treaties,. Rather, just as in
contractual law, once an agreement is broken by one party,
the other party is freed from its obligations thereunder.)
However, despite the gross violation of Resolution 242 by Egypt and
Syria through their aggression, Israel returned 100% of the territory it
captured in the Yom Kippur War to these countries. In addition, after concluding the 1979 Camp
David Peace Accords, Israel transferred full control of the Sinai to Egypt,
thereby returning over 90% of the territory captured in the 1967 war. This surely satisfies the non-specific
withdrawal component of Resolution 242, which called for a partial withdrawal
from territories, but not from all of the territories. Furthermore, there is no specification in the
Resolution requiring Israel to return territories to each individual
country. Thus, even if Resolution 242 is
binding or should be treated as such, Israel, by returning over 90% of the
territory captured in that war, has already fulfilled its requirements under
international law.
The PLO, unlike Egypt and Jordan, had not accepted Resolution 242,
and was therefore unwilling to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel in exchange
for land, since peace would mean recognition of Israels right to exist. However, despite being committed to the
continuation of an armed struggle against the Jewish State, the PLO lacked the
military strength to achieve their goal of re-taking any territory from Israeli
control. King Hussein, for his part,
realized that the restoration of the West Bank would only be achieved through
negotiation, and thus would be based on Resolution 242.[59] When the Rabat resolution of 1974 recognized
the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, the
re-acquisition of the West Bank became the responsibility of the PLO, and not
of Jordan. King Hussein opposed the
resolution at first, but under intense pressure, eventually signed it.[60] Despite this, the renunciation of Jordanian
claims to the West Bank was only officially proclaimed by King Hussein in July 1988.[61] When Israel and Jordan finally signed a peace
accord in 1994, mutual recognition and respect for sovereignty were achieved
without any withdrawal from territory (except for a small sliver of land
simultaneously leased back to Israel), proving both that Jordan no longer
attempted to claim Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem as its own, and that
withdrawal from territory was not the main impetus to peace between Israel and
her neighbors.[62]
In 1975, the US declared its refusal to negotiate with the PLO as
long as that organization continued to reject Resolution 242 and Israels right
to exist. In 1988, Yasser Arafat managed
to agree to Resolution 242, within the context of Resolution 181, also known as
the Palestine Partition Plan.
Essentially, despite seeming to agree with Resolution 242, by citing it
within the context of the 1947 Palestine Partition Plan, which prescribed a
Jewish State even smaller than that which was established within the 1949
armistice lines (including the internationalization of Jerusalem), Arafat made
Resolution 242 irrelevant. The
implementation of Resolution 181 would strip Israel of Jerusalem, the Golan
Heights, and large sections of the Galilee, in addition to Judea, Samaria and its
legal claim to Gaza. (Additionally, it
should be noted that Arafats acquiescence to Resolutions 181 and 242 directly
contradicts Articles 19 and 21 of the PLO Charter, adopted in 1964 and amended
in 1968. Article 19 of the PLO Charter
declares that the 1947 Partition of Palestine is null and void, as is the
establishment of the State of Israel.[63] Article 21 states: The Palestinian Arab people, in expressing itself through the armed Palestinian
revolution, rejects every solution that is a substitute for a complete
liberation of Palestine, and rejects all plans that aim at the settlement of
the Palestine issue or its internationalization.[64] This contradiction has never been resolved by
the Palestinian leadership, who has refused to amend these relevant and hostile
Articles of their Charter.)[65]
While Palestinian self-determination is not mentioned in
Resolution 242, this Resolution has been used as the basis for this demand by
the Arab world in general and by the Palestinians in particular. When an Arab state was offered to the Arab
population of the western portion of the Mandate for Palestine by UN Resolution
181 in 1947, that sovereignty was rejected by their Arab leadership and by the
Arab States. During the 19-year
occupation of Judea, Samaria and Gaza by Jordan and Egypt, no claims were put forth
by the Palestinians for a homeland or for recognition of their legitimate
rights. In fact, the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964, three years before the
Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory supposedly began. Rather, the PLOs stated goal has always been
the conquest of the land controlled by Israel since 1948, and not just the
territories liberated in 1967. In 1985,
Abu Iyad, as head of the PLOs Fatah military
department, stated in a BBC interview: When we say occupied Palestine
we
consider all Palestine occupied
Our resistance will be everywhere inside the
territory and that is not defined in terms of the West Bank and Gaza.[66] The support of the Arab world for the
self-determination of the Palestinian people therefore becomes yet another
means to affect the reduction of Israel to its vulnerable 1949 armistice lines.[67] Palestinian self-determination was
retroactively read into the Resolution.
The omission of any mention of Palestinian rights, and the only general
mention of the refugee problem, indicate that the Resolution and its authors
were not attempting to bestow or even acknowledge any rights of the
Palestinians. The Resolution dealt only
with the national entities that had fought in the Six Day War. When the PLO began to gain power in the
international arena, even receiving official UN General Assembly observer
status in 1975, more and more countries began to assume that Palestinian
acquiescence to Resolution 242 was critical.
However, the Resolution neither referred to the Palestinians directly
nor obligated any party to grant them land, autonomy, or national rights. Unfortunately, while more can be said about
Palestinian claims for self-determination, it is beyond the scope of this paper
to elaborate any further upon the issue.
Israel, as stated above, accepted Resolution 242 several months
after its passage in the Security Council.
Israel considered the Resolution to be a major step forward in its
attempts to eventually reach peace settlements with its Arab neighbors. Israel interpreted the Resolution to mean
that final borders would be decided through negotiations by the different
parties, with the ultimate purpose of the negotiations being the recognition of
Israel by the Arab states and comprehensive peace treaties between the
sides. Nevertheless, Israel, who saw its
historical and eternal capital divided by Jordanian occupation following that
countrys illegal conquest of Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem in the 1948
war, decided to annex the eastern portion of the city shortly after the Six Day
War and to officially unite the eastern and western portions of Jerusalem under
Israeli and Jewish sovereignty for the first time since the year 63 BCE (when
the Roman Empire, under General Pompei Magnus,
invaded and occupied the Kingdom of Judea) by passing the Basic Law: Jerusalem
on July 30, 1980.[68] (The UN condemned this decision as null and
void in its Security Council Resolution 478.)
Furthermore, the Golan Heights Law was passed on December 14, 1981 by
the Israeli Knesset, thereby incorporating the Golan Heights completely into
the State of Israel.[69]
Following the Six Day War, Israel instituted a military
administration for the territories of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. It intended to maintain possession of the
territories until the conclusion of peace treaties in order to determine their
final status. In the 1979 Camp David
Accords, Prime Minister Menachem Begin agreed that
the sovereignty of Judea, Samaria and Gaza would be determined by negotiations
involving representatives from Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians.[70] Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, Israel
granted civilian control of most of Judea, Samaria and Gaza to the Palestinian
Authority, allowing nearly 98% of the Palestinians in these territories to live
under Palestinian rule.[71] In 2005, Israel withdrew all military forces
and expelled all Jewish civilians from the Gaza Strip, thereby relinquishing
control over that territory. Yet, all of
these were unnecessary, and ultimately damaging, steps taken by Israel,
including the belated inclusion of eastern Jerusalem and the Golan Heights
under Israeli sovereignty. Eastern
Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Judea, Samaria and Gaza were all included in the
Mandate for Palestine and were always intended to be part of the Jewish
State. Jewish title over these
territories never ceased, despite the illegal Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian
occupations. However, the government of
Israel either was unaware of the legal title of the Jewish people to these
lands or worse, ignored it. All of these
territories could have been annexed immediately following the Six Day War. Even if the UN refused to recognize such an
annexation (as it did with the unification of Jerusalem), per the restrictions
imposed upon the UN by Article 80 of its Charter, that organization has no
legal right to change the status of these territories. The government of Israel, by its refusal to
annex these territories immediately, cast doubt on the legal right of the
Jewish People to these lands, a grievous error.
Judea, Samaria and Gaza were neither unallocated territories nor
territories without a sovereign. De
jure sovereignty of these territories was always vested in the Jewish
People, embodied by the State of Israel, and putting aside the issues of
demography and national electoral rights, both of which are beyond the scope of
this paper -- Israel should have acted in a manner befitting a sovereign,
namely by exercising its right to annex all of these lands immediately
following the culmination of warfare in June 1967.
Conclusion
Resolution 242
will continue to play a major role in the interaction between Israel and her
neighbors now and in the future. Yet,
the importance placed on this Resolution has no basis in international law. It is merely used as a political weapon
against Israel, by nations and international organizations hostile to it, in
order to diminish the Jewish State. What
is truly baffling, however, is that Israels leadership has not emphasized the
irrelevance of this Resolution in regards to her legal rights under
international law.
·
The
territories of Gaza, Judea, Samaria, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights are
all part of the original Mandate for Palestine, and came into the possession of
Arab countries (namely, Egypt, Jordan and Syria) illegally. The State of Israel, representing the Jewish
People, continued to hold the legal title to these lands from the issuance of
the Mandate in 1920 until these lands were liberated in 1967.
·
The
1949 Armistice Lines were never intended to be final, recognized borders between
Israel and her Arab neighbors; rather they were explicitly stated to be mere
ceasefire lines.
·
The
circumstances leading up to the outbreak of war on June 5, 1967 were such that
Israel launched a preemptive defensive strike against the Arab armies which had
surrounded it and had announced their intention to launch a war of aggression
and annihilation against the Jewish State.
·
While
it is true that Resolution 242 is a Security Council Resolution, because it was
passed under Chapter VI and not under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is a
non-binding directive. It is merely a
recommendation, even if a strongly-worded one.
·
Even
if Resolution 242 was a binding Resolution, it would be a bilateral agreement
between Israel on the one side, and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan on the other. Egypt and Syria violated the Resolutions
insistence on negotiations leading to final borders by launching a surprise
attack on Israeli forces in October 1973.
Such a fundamental violation of the Resolution by these two countries absolved
Israel of any obligation to honor the Resolution with regards to these two
countries. Regarding Jordan, the peace
agreement signed in 1994 between Israel and that country renders Resolution 242
irrelevant, as that peace agreement settled the major issues of secure and
recognized borders and put an end to the state of belligerency between them.
·
Resolution
242 does not require Israel to withdraw from all of the territories captured in
the 1967 War. It states that Israel
should exchange territories for Arab recognition of secure and recognized
borders. The Resolution also implies
that Israels borders prior to June 5, 1967 were neither secure nor
recognized. The 1979 peace agreement
between Israel and Egypt, which returned 90% of the territory captured by
Israel in the Six Day War, surely satisfies this non-specific withdrawal
component.
Thus, Israel was
never under any obligation to abide by Resolution 242, because the lands it
liberated in that war always legally belonged to the Jewish National Home
envisioned by the Mandate for Palestine, which is embodied by the State of
Israel. Yet while Israel is not legally
obligated to abide by Resolution 242, it has certainly fulfilled more than its
part. The Arab states, specifically
Egypt and Syria, while also not legally obligated to abide by the Resolution,
nevertheless grossly violated it in 1973, and continue to allow terrorist proxy
organizations to operate from their territories to attack the Jewish
State. Arab countries purposely
perpetuate the Palestinian refugee issue, denying citizenship and integration
to these Palestinians, in order to use them as a dangerous political and
terroristic weapon against Israel. And,
to this day, Arab recognition of Israel does not recognize Israels right
to exist; rather only the unfortunate fact that Israel does exist. This includes Egypt and Jordan, the two Arab
states with peace treaties and tepid diplomatic ties with Israel.
The authors of Resolution 242 attempted to create a different type
of Resolution after the Six Day War. The
Resolutions which ended the 1948 and 1956 wars were concerned solely with the
cessation of hostilities between Israel and her neighbors. Resolution 242, in contrast, attempted to
address the core issues which could lead to a lasting peace in the region.[72] However, the United Nations ignored three
main issues, mainly because it was and still is unable to deal effectively with
any issues relating to Justice and Truth.
First of all, the two sides in the 1967 war were not morally equal. One side was the aggressor, while the other
was the victim. The victim, Israel in
this case, triumphed in the final outcome; however that triumph does not
retroactively convert Israel, as the victor, into the aggressor. (Might does not make Right, but it does not
necessarily make Wrong.) Even though
Israel emerged victorious from the war, this fact has no ameliorative bearing
on the guilt of the Arab parties in commencing hostilities against the Jewish
State. Secondly, requiring the victim of
aggression to return territories captured in a war of self-defense only
encourages future aggression. Why should
an aggressor fear embarking on another war of aggression if it is allowed to
return to the status quo ante that existed before its failed attempt at
conquest and annihilation? Lastly, a
dangerous naοvetι exists in assuming that something intangible (namely,
recognition and peace) can be honestly bartered with something tangible
(territory). Once a tangible object,
such as territory, has been transferred, it can only be retaken by force. It is either in the possession of one side or
the other. However, an intangible thing
such as recognition or peace can be granted one day and rescinded the next,
with little or no risk involved. The
equation thus created by Resolution 242 is not only naοve, but it enhances the
main weakness of democracies when dealing with dictatorships. The democracy, in this case Israel, is
required to trust the promises of dictatorships, that once recognition is
granted and territory transferred, the agreements signed will be honored. Echoes of the 1938
abandonment and subsequent conquest of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany
while the nations of the world stood idly by would do well to remind the
leaders of Israel the fate that awaits those countries who subordinate their
national interests to the will of the international community and to the
promises of dictatorships.
The United Nations as an organization is ill-equipped to solve the
existential nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead, it confuses cause and effect,
morally equates the aggressor and the victim, and treats the issue as a mere
territorial conflict between neighbors.
It should be noted that because the United Nations treats democracies
and dictatorships as equals, it is inherently unable to make decisions based on
Truth and Justice, since these two issues are foreign to dictatorships. Moreover, whereas democracies reach
agreements through compromise, dictatorships reach agreements through the use
of force and threats. Because the
international stage is one of anarchy, agreements between nations must be
reached through compromise, often between democracies and dictatorships. Compromise and Justice are certainly not
synonymous. The language of Resolution
242, including its ambiguities, was a deliberate political act in order to
ensure the consensus necessary to secure the Resolutions passage in the
Security Council, which automatically implies that the language of the Resolution
had more to do with Expediency than with Justice. Yet, several times the word just is
mentioned in the Resolution, specifically in regards to achieving a just and
lasting peace in the region, and to finding a just settlement of the refugee
problem. Both of these mentions of justice
are pitiful considering that the Resolution goes on to morally equate the
victim Israel with her Arab aggressors.
Yet the UNs moral cowardice is even more evident in its mention of only
Israel by name in Resolution 242 (and, then, only in the context of the
Resolutions withdrawal component), despite having a war of annihilation
thrust upon it by the combined armies of three Arab states, thus implicitly
labeling Israel as the aggressor.
Moreover, the adjective just in regards to the refugee problem is
grossly hypocritical considering the facts presented regarding the clear
favoritism shown by the UN towards UNRWA over UNHCR, despite the latter
organizations greater and far more complicated responsibilities, and the
international communitys hypocrisy in refusing to expect the Arab countries to
properly integrate the Palestinian refugees residing in their respective
countries.
Resolution 242 endangers the State of Israel. The UN illegally attempted to divide the western
portion of the Mandate for Palestine between a Jewish State (authorized by the
Mandate) and an Arab State (not authorized by the Mandate) in its 1947
Partition Plan, and failed when Israel finished its War of Independence
controlling those lands allocated to it by the plan and more. The UN shirked its responsibility and raison
dκtre in the weeks leading up to the outbreak of warfare in 1967, not only
failing to prevent the outbreak of war, but contributing significantly to the
wars inevitability by withdrawing UNEF from the Sinai Peninsula. Resolution 242 is a continuation of that
first attempt in 1947 at diminishing the lands to which the Jewish People are
entitled under the Mandate for Palestine and international law.
Resolution 242 was
unable to prevent the outbreak of war in 1973.
The only peace in the Middle East that succeeds is peace through
strength and deterrence. Peace will
come from security and not security from peace.[73] The real root cause of the Arab-Israeli
conflict is the Arab refusal to recognize Israels right to exist within any
boundaries. Therefore, no treaty or
peace settlement and no UN Resolution will provide Israel with security. Only Israels deterrent ability prevents war
from erupting. Therefore, Israel should
exercise its sovereign rights over Judea, Samaria and Gaza, without fear of
causing another regional war. The Arab
dictatorships surrounding Israel will go to war when it suits them, only
needing a pretext, not a true moral justification. The UN is no different, as it has always
found a pretext for criticizing and condemning Israel. Thus, Israel should cease fearing these
inevitabilities, as it is condemned regardless of its behavior or the legality
of its actions, and exercise its true, legal rights in its Land.
·
Israel
should annex Judea, Samaria and Gaza, under its legal right to these lands as
sanctioned by the San Remo Peace Conference and the Mandate for Palestine.
·
Israel
should publicly declare that it has no responsibility to find any settlement
for Palestinian refugees, as their status has been purposely perpetuated by
Arab countries and the United Nations, in order to be used as a powerful
demographic, political and terroristic weapon against the Jewish State. The Arab states have more than enough land
and resources to adequately incorporate the several million Palestinian
refugees into their countries.
Israel should not
only state its case and its rights under international law, but it should
realize that it will never receive fair and unbiased treatment in an organization
such as the UN, which is based on Bargaining and not Justice. Israel would be better to withdraw from that
organization rather than to continue being unjustly disparaged, criticized and
condemned for daring to defend itself. There
is no excuse for Israels having allowed Resolution 242 to gain the
international standing and legitimacy which it has over the years. Israel should have exposed that Resolution,
as it should have exposed so many others, as unjust and irrelevant. Israels leadership must begin to properly, proudly
and forthrightly defend Israels right to exist and protect itself. While this surely wont solve the
Arab-Israeli conflict, it will allow Israel and her citizens to not only dwell
more securely, but know that they have the right to.
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[1] Grief, Howard. The Legal Foundation and Borders of Israel under International Law. (Jerusalem: Mazo Publishers, 2008), 18.
[2] First World War, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/versailles.htm (Accessed June 3, 2010)
[3] Treaty of Versailles, Article 22
[4] Grief, 33-36.
[5] Mandate for Palestine, Preamble.
[6] Mandate for Palestine
[7] Palestine Facts, World War I, Creation of Jordan, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_ww1_british_mandate_jordan.php (Accessed June 6, 2010)
[8] The Peace FAQ, The Golan Heights, http://www.peacefaq.com/golan.html (Accessed June 6, 2010)
[9] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), Part I / A (3).
[10] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UN General Assembly Resolution 181, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/UN%20General%20Assembly%20Resolution%20181 (Accessed July 2, 2010)
[11] Jewish Virtual Library, Myths and Facts, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf3.html (Accessed July 2, 2010)
[12] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), A (c)
[13] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), Part I / C, Chapter 2.
[14] Israel-Egypt Armistice Agreement, February 24, 1949, Article V(2).
[15] Charter of the United Nations, Article 1(1).
[16] Charter of the United Nations, Article 11(1).
[17] Charter of the United Nations, Article 11(3).
[18] Charter of the United Nations, Article 43, Paragraph 1.
[19] UN Security Council Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990.
[20] Netanyahu, Benjamin, A Durable Peace, (New York: Warner Books, 2000), 142.
[21] Oren, Michael. Six Days of War, (New York: Presidio Press, 2003), 46.
[22] Netanyahu, 144-145.
[23] Nasser quoted in H. Sachar, History of Israel, 633. Cited in Netanyahu, A Durable Peace, 143.
[24] Pogany, Istvan S. The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. (England: Gower Publishing Co. Ltd., 1984), 88-90.
[25] Bailey, 164.
[26] Bailey, 165-167.
[27] Oren, 77-79.
[28] Oren, 157-158.
[29] Pogany, 90.
[30] Oren, 184.
[31] Bailey, Sydney D. The Making of Resolution 242. (Dordrecht:Martinus Nujhoff Publishers, 1985), 68-69.
[32] Netanyahu, 148.
[33] Bailey, 91-92.
[34] Oren, 306.
[35] Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(4).
[36] Charter of the United Nations, Article 51.
[37] Answers.com, US Military Dictionary, http://www.answers.com/topic/preventive-war (Accessed July 20, 2010)
[38] Answers.com, US Military Dictionary, http://www.answers.com/topic/preemptive-war (Accessed July 20, 2010)
[39] Shue, Henry and David Rodin. Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 88.
[40] Pogany, 96-97.
[41] Bailey, 172.
[42] Bailey, 177-178.
[43] Bailey, 144-145.
[44] Bailey, 153-157.
[45] Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statements Clarifying the Meaning of UN Security Council Resolution 242, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/peace%20process/guide%20to%20the%20peace%20process/statements%20clarifying%20the%20meaning%20of%20un%20security%20c (Accessed July 15, 2010)
[46] Bailey, 152-153.
[47] Pogany, 107.
[48] Eidelberg, Paul. Sadats Strategy, (Canada: Dawn Books, 1979), 120-122.
[49] United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, 2(b)
[50] Netanyahu, 154-155.
[51] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), Paragraph 6, December 11, 1948.
[52] Beker, Avi. The United Nations and Israel. (USA: Lexington Books, 1988), 49-50.
[53] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (Accessed June 2, 2010)
[54] UNRWA, Overview, http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=85 (Accessed June 2, 2010)
[55] Beker, 50-51.
[56] Salibi, Kamil. The Modern History of Jordan (London: I.B. Tauris and Co., 1998), 225.
[57] Netanyahu, 150-151.
[58] Bailey, 178-180.
[59] Salibi, 251.
[60] Palestine Facts, Rabat Arab Summit, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_rabat_1974.php, (Accessed 30 May 2010)
[61] Salibi, 268.
[62] Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Jordan Peace Treaty, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Main%20Points%20of%20Israel-Jordan%20Peace%20Treaty (Accessed 18 July 2010)
[63] PLO Charter, Article 19.
[64] PLO Charter, Article 21.
[65] Netanyahu, 230-232.
[66] Abu Iyad interviewed on BBC, November 10, 1985. Cited in Netanyahu, A Durable Peace, 228.
[67] Netanyahu, 157-161.
[68] The Jewish Virtual Library, Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/Basic_Law_Jerusalem.html (Accessed July 20, 2010)
[69] The Jewish Virtual Library, The Golan Heights Law, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/golan.html (Accessed July 20, 2010)
[70] Grief, 688-689.
[71] Netanyahu, 341.
[72] Pogany, 108.
[73] Netanyahu, 272-275.